It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and
harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba,
threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing,
by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that
garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival
of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding
position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both,
that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it
will be exceedingly gratifying to us."
To this General Garcia replied that he would "take measures at once to
carry out your (Miles') recommendation, but concentration of forces
will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march
without delay." Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy
that Garcia "regards his (Miles') wishes and suggestions as orders,
and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points
indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of
his expedition at Banes Port, Cuba, but will march without delay. All
of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United
States troops and to place themselves under orders." It was in
compliance with these requests that General Garcia had the five
thousand troops so near Santiago at the time he welcomed Shafter and
Sampson to his camp, as mentioned above, and there is every necessary
evidence that these Cuban troops took part in the fight about
Santiago.
Pages:
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173