We
had all considered, and were of one mind, first, that the House was
an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Secondly, that it
might call for papers generally. Thirdly, that the executive ought to
communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought
to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public:
consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourthly, that neither the
committee nor House had a right to call on the Head of a department, who
and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee
should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the
President. We had principally consulted the proceedings of the Commons
in the case of Sir Robert Walpole, 13 Chandler's Debates. For the first
point, seepages 161, 170, 172,183, 187,207; for the second, pages 153,
173,207; for the third, 81, 173, Appendix, page 44; for the fourth, page
246. Note: Hamilton agreed with us in all these points, except as to the
power of the House to call on Heads of departments. He observed, that
as to his department, the act constituting it had made it subject to
Congress, in some points, but he thought himself not so far subject, as
to be obliged to produce all the papers they might call for. They might
demand secrets of a very mischievous nature. [Here I thought he began
to fear they would go to examining how far their own members and other
persons in the government had been dabbling in stocks, banks, &c.
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