I believe, on the contrary, that it is instinct and
innate, that the moral sense is as much a part of our constitution as
that of feeling, seeing, or hearing; as a wise creator must have seen to
be necessary in an animal destined to live in society: that every human
mind feels pleasure in doing good to another: that the non-existence of
justice is not to be inferred from the fact that the same act is deemed
virtuous and right in one society which is held vicious and wrong
in another; because, as the circumstances and opinions of different
societies vary, so the acts which may do them right or wrong must vary
also; for virtue does not consist in the act we do, but in the end it
is to effect. If it is to effect the happiness of him to whom it
is directed, it is virtuous, while, in a society under different
circumstances and opinions, the same act might produce pain, and would
be vicious. The essence of virtue is in doing good to others, while what
is good may be one thing in one society, and its contrary in another.
Yet, however we may differ as to the foundation of morals (and as
many foundations have been assumed as there are writers on the subject
nearly), so correct a thinker as Tracy will give us a sound system of
morals. And, indeed, it is remarkable, that so many writers, setting out
from so many different premises, yet meet all in the same conclusions.
This looks as if they were guided unconsciously, by the unerring-hand of
instinct.
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