This would not have been so, had the people retained organized
means of acting on their agents. In this example, then, let us read a
lesson for ourselves, and not 'go, and do likewise.'
Since writing my letter of July the 12th, I have been told, that on the
question of equal representation, our fellow-citizens in some sections
of the State claim peremptorily a right of representation for their
slaves. Principle will, in this, as in most other cases, open the way
for us to correct conclusion. Were our State a pure democracy, in which
all its inhabitants should meet together to transact all their business,
there would yet be excluded from their deliberations, 1. Infants, until
arrived at years of discretion. 2. Women, who, to prevent depravation
of morals, and ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the
public meetings of men. 3, Slaves, from whom the unfortunate state of
things with us takes away the rights of will and of property. Those,
then, who have no will, could be permitted to exercise none in the
popular assembly; and of course could delegate none to an agent in a
representative assembly. The business, in the first case, would be done
by qualified citizens only; and, in the second, by the representatives
of qualified citizens only. It is true, that in the general
constitution, our State is allowed a larger representation on account
of its slaves. But every one knows, that that constitution was a
matter of compromise; a capitulation between conflicting interests
and opinions.
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